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Abstract 
 
We show that the positive relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns 
documented in Gompers and Metrick (2001) is driven by short-term institutions. Furthermore, short-
term institutions’ trading forecasts future stock returns. This predictability does not reverse in the 
long run and is stronger for small and growth stocks. Short-term institutions’ trading is also 
positively related to future earnings surprises. By contrast, long-term institutions’ trading does not 
forecasts future returns, nor is it related to future earnings news. Our results are consistent with the 
view that short-term institutions are better informed and they trade actively to exploit their 
informational advantage.  
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Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-term Institutions Better Informed? 
 
This paper examines the relation between institutions’ investment horizons and their 
informational roles in the stock market. Although a large body of literature has studied the behavior 
of institutional trading and its impact on asset prices and returns,1 the informational role of 
institutional investors remains an open question. Gompers and Metrick (2001) document a positive 
relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns. However, they attribute this 
relation to temporal demand shocks rather than institutions’ informational advantage. Nofsinger and 
Sias (1999) find that changes in institutional ownership forecast next year’s returns, suggesting that 
institutional trading contains information about future returns. In contrast, Cai and Zheng (2004) find 
that institutional trading has negative predictive ability for next quarter’s returns. Bennett, Sias, and 
Starks (2003) show that the evidence of institutions’ ability to forecast returns is sensitive to how 
institutional trading is measured. 
One potential reason for the mixed results regarding institutional investors’ informational role 
is that most studies in this literature focus on all institutional investors as a group. While institutional 
investors share some important commonalities, they are far from homogeneous. An important 
dimension of heterogeneity is the investment horizon. Institutions may have different investment 
horizons because of differences in investment objectives and styles, legal restrictions, and 
competitive pressures; in addition, their investment horizons may differ because of their different 
informational roles. 
There are several reasons why one might expect institutions with different investment horizons 
to be differentially informed. First, if some institutional investors possess superior information and 
can regularly identify undervalued or overvalued stocks, we would expect these institutions to trade 
frequently to exploit their informational advantage or skill (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and 
Wermers (2000)). On the other hand, institutional investors possessing limited information would 
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trade more cautiously. Therefore, institutions who trade more actively (short-term institutions) would 
be better informed than those who trade less actively (long-term institutions).2 Second, one might 
argue that long-term institutions trade infrequently because they only trade based on information. On 
the other hand, short-term institutions might also trade based on noise, perhaps due to overconfidence 
(e.g., Odean (1998) and Barber and Odean (2000)). In this case, it would appear on average that 
long-term institutions are better informed than short-term institutions. Third, it is also possible that 
both short- and long-term institutions are informed. However, short-term institutions are better at 
collecting and processing short-term information, while long-term institutions are better at collecting 
and processing long-term information. As a result, short-term institutions would be better informed in 
the short run while long-term institutions would be better informed in the long run. 
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the informational roles of short- and long-
term institutions. Specifically, using quarterly institutional holdings for the period from 1980 to 2003, 
we construct an investment horizon measure based on institutions’ portfolio turnover, which is 
similar to that of Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005). We then classify institutions into short- and long-
term based on this measure. In our empirical analyses, we first examine whether short- and long-term 
institutions have different preferences for stock characteristics. We then examine the extent to which 
investment horizon impacts the relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns. 
More importantly, we investigate whether short- and long-term institutional trading contains 
information about future stock returns and future earnings. 
We find that both short- and long-term institutions prefer larger stocks and stocks with higher 
book-to-market ratios, share price, and volatility. Compared to long-term institutions, short-term 
institutions prefer younger firms, and firms with higher turnover and lower dividend yield. In 
addition, we find that only short-term institutions are momentum traders.  
Consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001), we find a significant and positive relation 
between total institutional ownership and one-quarter-ahead and one-year-ahead stock returns. 
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Moreover, we show that this positive relation is almost entirely driven by short-term institutions: The 
predictive power of total institutional ownership is completely subsumed by short-term institutional 
ownership. In contrast, long-term institutional ownership does not have incremental predictive power 
for future returns.  
To test whether the predictive ability of institutional ownership is due to temporal demand 
shocks or institutions’ informational advantage, we decompose the current institutional ownership 
into lagged institutional ownership and institutional trading.3 Our results show that lagged 
institutional ownership by short-term institutions forecasts future returns, suggesting that demand 
shocks impact returns. More importantly, short-term institutions’ trading also strongly predicts future 
returns. Since our results are obtained after controlling for various stock characteristics including size, 
book-to-market, and past returns, they cannot be explained by short-term institutions following 
certain investment styles that have been shown to explain cross-sectional stock returns. In particular, 
our results are not driven by the momentum effect. The predictive power of the short-term 
institutional trading is thus consistent with the hypothesis that short-term institutions are informed.  
In contrast to the results for short-term institutions, we find no evidence that either the level or 
the change in long-term institutional ownership is significantly related to future stock returns. This 
result is not driven by institutions that follow index investment strategies. Long-term institutions do 
not predict future returns after we exclude those fund families that specialize in index funds, or 
during the first half of our sample period (1980-1991) when index products are relatively 
undeveloped.  
To the extent that short-term institutions have an informational advantage, we would expect 
their advantage to be greater for small and growth stocks, which tend to have greater information 
uncertainty and are more difficult to value. Consistent with this prediction, we find that short-term 
institutional trading has stronger predictive power for small and growth stocks than for large and 
value stocks.  
 
 
 6
Our main results also hold with a portfolio approach. A zero-investment strategy that is long in 
the portfolio of stocks with the largest increase in short-term institutional holdings and short in the 
portfolio of stocks with the largest decrease in short-term institutional holdings generates 2.16% 
(1.62% after adjusting for Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) benchmark returns) over 
the first year after portfolio formation. By contrast, there is no significant return difference among 
portfolios sorted by changes in long-term institutional ownership. 
We also examine whether institutional trading is related to future earnings news. We find 
stocks that experience the largest increase in short-term institutional holdings have significantly 
higher earnings surprises and earnings announcement abnormal returns over the subsequent four 
quarters than stocks that experience the largest decrease in short-term institutional holdings. In 
contrast, we find little evidence that trading by long-term institutions is related to either future 
earnings surprises or earnings announcement abnormal returns. These results provide evidence that 
short-term institutions possess superior information about future earnings. 
An alternative explanation for our results is that short-term institutional investors pressure 
managers to maximize short-run profits at the expense of long-run firm value (the “short-term 
pressure” hypothesis; e.g., Porter (1992), Bushee (1998, 2001)). In particular, Bushee (1998) finds 
evidence that firms with higher transient institutional ownership are more likely to underinvest in 
long-term, intangible projects such as R&D to reverse an earnings decline. The short-term pressure 
hypothesis might help explain the short-run predictive ability of short-term institutional ownership 
and trading, but it also predicts long-run price reversal for stocks held or traded by short-term 
institutions. To test this prediction, we examine the relation between institutional ownership or 
trading and future stock returns up to three years. We find no evidence of long-run price reversal for 
stocks held or recently traded by short-term institutional investors, suggesting that our results cannot 
be explained by the short-term pressure hypothesis. We also find no evidence that either the holdings 
or trading by long-term institutional investors predicts long-run stock returns. This result is 
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inconsistent with the hypothesis that long-term institutions are better informed about long-run 
returns.4  
To our knowledge, this is the first paper in the finance literature that focuses on the 
informational roles of short- and long-term institutions.5 In particular, our results suggest that short-
term institutions are better informed, and that they trade actively to exploit their informational 
advantage. Our results do not imply market inefficiency; rather, they are consistent with the idea that 
the stock market is informationally efficient (Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980)) because short-term 
institutions must expend resources in collecting, processing, and trading on information.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section 2 examines institutional preferences. Section 3 investigates the impact 
of institutional holdings and trading on future stock returns for both short- and long-term institutional 
investors. Section 4 concludes.  
 
1. Data, Variables, and Descriptive Statistics 
1.1. Data and Sample 
The data for this study come from four sources. We obtain quarterly institutional holdings for 
all common stocks traded on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX), and NASDAQ for the period from the fourth quarter of 1979 to the fourth quarter of 2003 
from Thomson Financial. The SEC requires that all investment managers with discretion over 13F 
securities worth $100 million or more report all equity positions greater than 10,000 shares or 
$200,000 to the SEC at the end of each quarter. Institutional ownership (hereafter IO) for each stock 
is defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. We exclude those observations with total institutional ownership greater than 
100%. 
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We obtain stock return, share price, number of shares outstanding, and turnover from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly tapes for all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks. 
We obtain book value of equity, cash dividend, and quarterly earnings announcement dates from 
COMPUSTAT. Finally, analysts’ earnings forecasts are from I/B/E/S.  
 
1.2. Classification of Short- and Long-term Institutions 
We classify institutional investors into short- and long- term investors based on their portfolio 
turnover over the past four quarters. Specifically, each quarter, we first calculate the aggregate 
purchase and sale for each institution:  
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where Pi,t-1 and Pi,t are the share prices for stock i at the end of quarter t-1 and t, and Sk,i,t-1 and Sk,i,t  are 
the number of shares of stock i held by investor k at the end of quarter t-1 and t respectively. We 
adjust stock splits and stock dividends by using the CRSP price adjustment factor. CR_buyk,t and 
CR_sellk,t are institution k’s aggregate purchase and sale for quarter t, respectively. Institution k’s 
churn rate for quarter t is then defined as: 
∑
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The above definition is similar in spirit to Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). The main 
difference is that we use the minimum of aggregate purchase and sale, whereas Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos (2005) use the sum of aggregate purchase and sale. The advantage of our measure is that it 
minimizes the impact of investor cash flows on portfolio turnover.6 CRSP uses a very similar 
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approach to calculate mutual fund turnover. Next, we calculate each institution’s average churn rate 
over the past four quarters as:  
∑
=
−=
3
0
,, 4
1_
j
jtktk CRCRAVG                         (4) 
Given the average churn rate measure, each quarter we sort all institutional investors into 
three tertile portfolios based on AVG_CRk,t. Those ranked in the top tertile (with the highest 
AVG_CRk,t) are classified as short-term institutional investors and those ranked in the bottom tertile 
are classified as long-term institutional investors. Finally, for each stock, we define the short-term 
(long-term) institutional ownership (hereafter SIO and LIO) as the ratio between the number of 
shares held by short-term (long-term) institutional investors and the total number of shares 
outstanding. 
 
1.3. Firm Characteristics 
 Similar to Gompers and Metrick (2001), our analysis focuses on the following ten firm 
characteristics: MKTCAP - market capitalization calculated as share price times total shares 
outstanding using data from CRSP. AGE – firm age calculated as the number of months since first 
return appears in CRSP.  DP – dividend yield calculated as cash dividend divided by share price. BM 
– book-to-market ratio is book value for the fiscal year ended before the most recent June 30, divided 
by market capitalization of December 31 during that fiscal year. PRC - share price from CRSP. 
TURN – average monthly turnover over the past 3 months. VOL - volatility estimated as the standard 
deviation of monthly returns over the previous two years. SP500 – dummy variable for S&P 500 
index membership. RETt-3,t – cumulative gross return over the past three months. RETt-12,t-3 – 
cumulative gross return over the nine months preceding the beginning of filing quarter. Following 
Gompers and Metrick, we use natural log for all the above variables except for the SP500, RETt-3,t , 
and RETt-12,t-3. 
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1.4. Descriptive Statistics 
We compute, for each quarter, mean cross-sectional institutional ownership and firm 
characteristics for the period from the third quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 2003. Panel A of 
Table 1 reports the time-series mean, median, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation of these 
94 cross-sectional averages. The average institutional ownership is 25.1% over our sample period. 
This result is similar to Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), who report a 23% average institutional 
ownership for the period from 1983 to 1997. On average, short-term institutions hold 7.91% of total 
shares outstanding while long-term institutions hold 6.56% of all shares.  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
The average firm has a market capitalization of $961.44 million, a dividend yield of 2.21%, a 
book-to-market ratio of 0.74, and approximately 12 years of CRSP return data. The monthly 
volatility and turnover for the average firm are 13.59% and 7.8% respectively. The average number 
of stocks in our sample is 5,911. In comparison, Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) report an average of 
5,425 stocks in their sample for 1983-1997. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional correlations between 
institutional ownership and various firm characteristics. Total institutional ownership (IO) is 
positively correlated with size, age, price, turnover, and S&P 500 dummy, while negatively 
correlated with volatility. Both short- and long-term institutional ownership (SIO and LIO) are 
positively correlated with size, firm age, and S&P 500 dummy, and are negatively correlated with 
volatility. However, LIO has stronger correlations with these variables than SIO does. Further, SIO is 
significantly positively correlated with turnover, whereas LIO is uncorrelated with turnover. This 
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result suggests that short-term institutions care more about liquidity than long-term institutions. SIO 
has weak positive correlations with past returns, while the correlations between LIO and past returns 
are virtually zero. In addition, LIO is positively correlated with book-to-market ratio and dividend 
yield, while SIO is not correlated with these variables. Overall, the above results suggest that there 
exist systematic differences between long- and short-term institutional preferences. We note that 
these bivariate correlations should be interpreted with caution because of the strong correlations 
between firm characteristics (reported in Panel C of Table 1). In the next section, we use a 
multivariate regression analysis to study the preferences of both short- and long-term institutions.  
 
2. Preferences of Short- and Long-term Institutional Investors 
Prior literature (e.g., Falkenstein (1996), Del Guercio (1996), Gompers and Metrick (2001), 
and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003)) has examined the relation between institutional holdings and 
firm characteristics. They document that institutional investors prefer certain firm characteristics 
such size, share price, and turnover. In this section, we explore whether short- and long-term 
institutional investors exhibit different preferences for firm characteristics. 
Following Gompers and Metrick (2001), we include three sets of firm characteristics in our 
analysis. Firm size, age, dividend yield, S&P 500 index membership, and stock volatility are used to 
proxy for prudence (e.g., Del Guercio (1996)). Firm size, share price, and stock turnover are related 
to liquidity and transaction costs. Past returns, book-to-market ratios, and firm size have been shown 
to predict future returns (e.g., Fama and French (1992) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). For each 
quarter from the third quarter of 1980 to the fourth quarter of 2003, we run the following cross-
sectional regression of institutional ownership on the above firm characteristics: 
tittittitititi
titititititi
eRETRETSPVOLTURN
PRCBMDPAGEMKTCAPINSTOWN
,3,12,10,3,9,8,7,6
,5,4,3,2,10,
500 ++++++
+++++=
−−− ααααα
αααααα
                  (5) 
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where INSTOWN is either total institutional ownership, short-term institutional ownership, or long-
term institutional ownership. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the time-series average of the coefficient estimates. Since 
institutional ownership is extremely persistent, we do not report any statistical significance based on 
the time-series of coefficient estimates (e.g., Fama-MacBeth standard errors). We follow Gompers 
and Metrick (2001) to report the number of significant positive and significant negative coefficients 
for 94 OLS regressions of (5). The first two columns report the results for total institutional 
ownership, while the last four columns report the results on short- and long-term institutional 
ownership. 
Institutional investors as a whole show strong preference for larger stocks, and stocks with 
higher book-to-market value, higher price, higher turnover, and lower dividend yield. For example, 
in each of the 94 quarterly cross-sectional regressions, the coefficient on market capitalization is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Further, institutional investors show some 
preference for older stocks, more volatile stocks, and stocks that are members of the S&P 500 index. 
These results are broadly consistent with prior studies on institutional preference. Consistent with 
Gompers and Metrick (2001), we find that the coefficients on past returns are significantly negative. 
Gompers and Metrick conclude from this result that institutional investors are not momentum 
investors. Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Sias (2005), on the other hand, show that even though 
institutional holdings are negatively related to past returns, institutional trading is positively related 
to past returns. Thus, they argue that institutional investors are momentum investors. We will 
examine this issue later when we present our results on institutional trading.  
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We find both similarities and significant differences between short- and long-term institutions’ 
preferences for stock characteristics. Both short- and long-term institutions prefer larger stocks, and 
stocks with higher book-to-market ratios and share prices. However, short-term institutions prefer 
younger firms, while long-term institutions prefer older firms. Specifically, 63 out of 94 coefficients 
on age are significantly negative in regressions of short-term institutional ownership, while 81 out of 
94 coefficients on age are significantly positive in regressions of long-term institutional ownership. 
Further, long-term institutions prefer S&P 500 firms, while short-term institutions are indifferent. In 
addition, short-term institutions show strong preference for firms with lower dividend yield, while 
long-term institutional ownership is not consistently related to dividend yield. These results suggest 
that short-term institutions are less concerned about prudence than long-term institutions.  
Although both short- and long-term institutions prefer stocks with higher turnover, short-term 
institutions have much stronger preference for turnover. This result suggests that short-term 
institutions care more about liquidity, presumably because they trade more actively. Finally, both 
short- and long-term investors’ holdings are negatively related to past three-month returns. However, 
their relations to past one-year returns are substantially different. Long-term institutional holdings are 
significantly negatively related to past one-year returns, while short-term institutional ownership is 
not significantly related to past one-year returns.  
To explore whether institutional investors are momentum investors along the lines of Bennett, 
Sias, and Starks (2003), we re-estimate regression (5) by replacing institutional ownership with 
changes in institutional ownership as the dependent variable. Panel B reports the regression results. 
We focus on the relation between institutional trading and past returns. Results in Panel B indicate 
that institutional investors as a whole are momentum investors: Institutional trading is significantly 
positively related to past three-month or one-year returns. Further analysis show that this result is 
primarily driven by short-term institutions. We find strong evidence that short-term investors are 
momentum traders. For example, the regression coefficient on past one-quarter return is significantly 
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positive for 87 quarters, while none is significantly negative. In contrast, we find little evidence that 
long-term institutional investors are momentum traders. The average point estimates on past returns 
are virtually zero, and for most quarters they are not statistically significant. 
 
3. The impact of institutional ownership and trading on stock returns 
3.1. The impact of institutional ownership on stock returns: short-term vs. long-term 
institutions 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) document a positive relation between institutional ownership and 
next quarter’s stock returns. In this section we examine the extent to which the predictive ability of 
institutional ownership is attributable to short- and long-term institutions. Specifically, for each 
quarter, we run the following cross-sectional regression of one-quarter-ahead (or one-year-ahead) 
stock returns on institutional ownership and various firm characteristics:  
( ) ( )
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          (6) 
where RETi,t,t+3, and RETi,t,t+12 are one-quarter-ahead and one-year-ahead stock returns respectively. 
To make sure the predictive ability of institutional ownership is not driven by its relation with other 
firm characteristics, we control for the same set of firm characteristics that we use in our analysis of 
institutional preference. Following Gompers and Metrick, we estimate regression equation (6) using 
weighted-least-squares, with each firm weighted by its log market capitalization. We estimate (6) 
quarter by quarter and use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method to calculate standard errors for the 
time-series average of coefficients. 
Table 3 reports the time-series average of coefficient estimates and the associated p-values. The 
dependent variable is one-quarter-ahead return for the first set of three regressions, while the 
dependent variable is one-year-ahead return for the second set of regressions. In the regression of 
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one-year-ahead returns, the residuals will be serially correlated because the dependent variable is 
overlapped. We report p-values based on the Newey-West (1987) standard errors to account for this 
autocorrelation. Within each set of regressions, we first include only total institutional ownership, 
and then add short-term or long-term institutional ownership to the regressions.  
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
We find strong evidence that institutional ownership forecast one-quarter-ahead returns. The 
average coefficient on IO is 0.019 and is statistically significant at 1 percent level. When we include 
both total institutional ownership (IO) and short-term institutional ownership (SIO) in the regression, 
the predictive power of IO is completely subsumed by SIO. The average coefficient for SIO is 0.054 
and statistically significant at 1 percent level. This result is also economically significant. A two-
standard deviation increase in SIO is associated with an increase in next quarter’s stock return by 
about 1.1%. After controlling for SIO, the point estimate for IO drops from 0.019 to 0.004, with a p-
value of 0.61. By contrast, when we include both IO and long-term institutional ownership (LIO) in 
the regression, the average coefficient on IO remains positive and significant while the average 
coefficient on LIO is actually negative and significant at the 5 percent level.7  
The results for one-year-ahead returns are similar. When used alone, current quarter IO has 
significant predicative power for the next year’s stock returns. However, after controlling for SIO, the 
predictive ability of IO disappears, while the average coefficient on SIO is positive and highly 
significant. Similar to the results on one-quarter-ahead returns, the marginal effect of long-term 
institutional ownership on one-year-ahead returns is significantly negative after controlling for total 
institutional ownership. 
Overall, the results in this section indicate that institutional ownership has strong predictive 
ability for both next quarter’s and next year’s returns. This result is consistent with Gompers and 
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Metrick (2001). More importantly, we show that this predictive ability is almost entirely driven by 
short-term institutions. By contrast, long-term institutional ownership does not have incremental 
predictive power for future stock returns. 
 
3.2. Demand shock vs. informational advantage 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) argue that two forces may be driving the positive relation 
between institutional ownership and future returns: institutions either provide persistent demand 
shocks or they have an informational advantage. To disentangle these two effects, they decompose 
the current quarter institutional ownership (IOt) into lagged institutional ownership (IOt-1) and the 
change in institutional ownership (∆IOt). If the predictability of institutional ownership is due to 
demand shock, given that institutional holdings are quite stable, one would expect that IOt-1 has a 
stronger predictive power. If institutional investors have an informational advantage, then ∆IOt 
should be a better predictor.  
To examine the sources of predictive ability of short-term institutional ownership, we 
decompose the current institutional holdings into lagged holdings and changes in holdings for both 
short- and long-term investors: SIOt-1, ∆SIOt, LIOt-1, and ∆LIOt. Next, for each quarter we run the 
following cross-sectional regression: 
( )
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Table 4 reports the time-series average of coefficients and associated p-values calculated based 
on the Newey-West standard errors. When we include only ownership variables in the regression, 
SIOt strongly predicts future returns, while the average coefficient on LIOt is statistically insignificant. 
This result is consistent with those reported in Table 4 that the predictive ability of total institutional 
ownership is driven by short-term institutions.  
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<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
When we include both lagged institutional holdings and changes in institutional holdings, the 
average coefficient on SIOt-1 is still statistically significant. This result suggests that demand shocks 
impact stock returns. More importantly, the average coefficient on ∆SIOt is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that short-term institutions are informed. Since our 
results are obtained after controlling for various stock characteristics including size, book-to-market, 
and past returns, they cannot be explained by short-term institutions following certain investment 
styles that have been shown to explain cross-sectional stock returns. In particular, our results are not 
driven by the momentum effect. In contrast, neither LIOt-1 nor ∆LIOt is significantly related to future 
stock returns. The results for one-year-ahead returns are qualitatively similar. Short-term institutions’ 
holdings and trading both forecast one-year-ahead returns, while neither holdings nor trading by 
long-term institutions has any predictive power for next year’s returns.  
Our results on short-term institutions are economically significant. A two-standard-deviation 
change in short-term institutional trading is associated with a change in next quarter’s return by 
0.53%, and is associated with a change in next year’s return by 1.63%. Overall, these results suggest 
that short-term institutions are informed. Moreover, they are better informed than long-term 
institutions. 
 
3.3. The information content of short-term institutional trading: small/big, value/growth 
If short-term institutions possess superior information about future returns, their informational 
advantage should be greater for smaller firms and firms with more growth opportunities. In general, 
these firms face more uncertainty and their values are more difficult to evaluate (e.g., Wermers (1999) 
and Sias (2004)). To test this implication, we divide all sample stocks into small/large and 
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value/growth categories. Specifically, each quarter, a firm is classified as a small firm if its market 
capitalization is lower than the NYSE median. Otherwise, it is considered a big firm. Similarly, a 
firm is classified as a growth firm if its book-to-market ratio is less than the cross-sectional median; 
otherwise, it is a value firm.  
We then re-estimate regression (7) for small/large and value/growth firms separately. If the 
predictive ability of short-term institutional trading reflects superior information, we would expect 
∆SIOt to have a stronger predictive power for small and growth stocks than for large and value stocks.  
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the regression results for small/large stocks. Again we examine both 
one-quarter-ahead and one-year-ahead returns. We focus our discussion on the coefficients on 
institutional trading because it better captures the informational advantage. For one-quarter-ahead 
returns, the average coefficient on ∆SIOt for small stocks is 0.087, about twice as large as that for 
large stocks (0.047). Since the standard deviations of ∆SIOt for small and large stocks are very 
similar (the average cross-sectional standard deviation for ∆SIOt is 4.1% for small stocks and 3.9% 
for large stocks), the above estimates for regression coefficients imply that the marginal effect of 
∆SIOt is about twice as big for small stocks as that for large stocks. In addition, although the 
coefficient estimates on ∆SIOt  are statistically significant for both small and large stocks, the p-value 
is smaller for small stocks (p-value = 0.01) than for large stocks (p-value = 0.03). Similar results hold 
for one-year-ahead returns. Both small and large firms have statistically significant coefficients on 
∆SIOt, but the point estimate is again bigger for small stocks than for large stocks (0.27 versus 0.19). 
Overall, we find evidence that the predictive power of short-term institutional trading is stronger for 
small stocks than for large stocks. 
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Consistent with our earlier results, we find no evidence that long-term institutional trading 
predicts future returns for either small or large stocks. For one-quarter-ahead returns, the average 
coefficients for LIOt-1 and ∆LIOt are insignificant for both small and large firms. The point estimates 
for ∆LIOt are actually negative. For one-year-ahead returns, although the coefficient on LIOt-1 is 
positive and statistically significant for small stocks, the average coefficient on ∆LIOt is statistically 
insignificant for both small and large stocks. 
Panel B report the results for value/growth stocks. Since the standard deviations of ∆SIOt are 
nearly identical between value and growth stocks (4% for value stocks and 4.1% for growth stocks), 
we can directly compare the magnitude of the coefficients on ∆SIOt across value and growth stocks. 
Results in Panel B indicate that for one quarter-ahead-returns, the coefficient on ∆SIOt is more than 
twice as large for growth stocks as that for value stocks (0.103 versus 0.04). Further, the coefficient 
on ∆SIOt is statistically significant at the 1 percent level for growth stocks, and only at the 5 percent 
level for value stocks.   
The results for one-year-ahead returns reveal even greater differences between growth and 
value stocks. The coefficient on SIOt-1 is statistically significant for growth stock but insignificant for 
value stocks. More importantly, the coefficient on ∆SIOt is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level for growth stocks, but only at the 10 percent level (p-value = 0.07) for value stocks.  In addition, 
the coefficient on ∆SIOt is 0.352 for growth stocks, about three times as high as that for value stocks 
(0.119).  
In summary, results in Table 5 indicate that short-term institutional trading has stronger 
predictive power for small and growth stocks than for large and value stocks. These results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that short-term institutional trading predicts future returns because 
they have an informational advantage. 
 
3.4. Portfolio approach 
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Thus far we have focused on a cross-sectional regression approach to examine the effect of 
institutional ownership and trading on future returns. This approach allows us to compare with prior 
studies (e.g., Gompers and Metrick (2001)), and to readily control for known predictors of future 
returns such as size, book-to-market, and past returns. To gauge the robustness of our results, in this 
section we use a portfolio approach.  
Specifically, we construct investment portfolios based on short- and long-term institutional 
trading. At the end of each quarter, we rank all sample stocks based on their current-quarter changes 
in short-/long-term institutional ownership, and sort them into five portfolios. We hold these 
portfolios for one year and report the cumulative value-weighted holding period returns on the 
portfolio of stocks with the largest increase in short-/long-term institutional holding (Q5) and returns 
on the portfolio of stocks with the largest decrease in the short-/long-term institutional holding (Q1). 
We also report the return on a zero-investment strategy that is long in portfolio Q5 and short in 
portfolio Q1, where Q5 and Q1 are formed every quarter as above, and held for one year. In addition 
to raw returns, we also report the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) benchmark-adjusted 
return. DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns allow us to control for the size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effect.  
 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
 
Table 6 reports the results on portfolios sorted by short- and long-term institutional trading. 
The portfolio of stocks with the largest increase in short-term institutional holdings earns higher 
returns than the portfolio of stocks with the largest decrease in the short-term institutional trading. 
For the raw return, the average quarterly return on the zero-investment strategy Q5-Q1 is 0.53% (t-
statistics = 3.16) over the four quarters after portfolio formation. This average return difference 
decreases to 0.41% using DGTW-adjusted returns, but is still statistically significant (t-statistics = 
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3.34). Over the one year after portfolio formation, the cumulative return difference between Q5 and 
Q1 is 2.16% (t-statistics = 2.77) using raw return, and is 1.62% using DGTW-adjusted returns (t-
statistics = 2.82).  
Consistent with our earlier results, we find no evidence that long-term institutional investors 
have stock-picking ability. Whether measured by raw returns or DGTW adjusted returns, there’s no 
significant spread between Q5 and Q1 portfolios. Indeed, the return differences between Q5 and Q1 
are actually negative for long-term institutional investors.  
In summary, results in Table 6 show a significant difference between long-term and short-term 
investors. Short-term institutions’ trading strongly predicts future returns while long-term 
institutions’ trading does not. These results are consistent with those reported in Table 4 and suggest 
that short-term institutional investors are better informed than long-term institutional investors.  
 
3.5. Institutional trading and future earnings news 
We have shown that short-term institutional trading contains information about future stock 
returns. To provide more direct evidence that short-term institutions possess private information that 
is useful in predicting future returns, we examine in this section the relation between institutional 
trading and future earnings news. We examine both earnings announcement abnormal returns and 
earnings surprises.  
We obtain analysts’ consensus quarterly earnings forecast and actual earnings from I/B/E/S. 
We obtain quarterly earnings announcement dates from the Compustat. The earnings announcement 
abnormal return is defined as the cumulative market-adjusted return over a 3-day window [-1,+1] 
around the earnings announcement date. The earnings surprise is defined as the difference between 
reported earnings and consensus analysts’ earnings forecast divided by the stock price of the previous 
quarter. Each quarter, we group stocks into five portfolios based on short-term/long-term institutional 
trading. Specifically, portfolio Q5 (Q1) contains stocks for which the quarterly institutional 
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ownership has increased (decreased) the most. For each portfolio at each quarter, we then calculate 
the median earnings announcement abnormal returns and earnings surprises over each of the next 
four quarterly earnings announcements.  
 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the time-series average of the median earnings announcement 
abnormal returns for portfolios Q5 and Q1, as well as the earnings announcement return difference 
between these two portfolios. Results in Table 7 indicate that short-term institutional trading is 
positively related to future earnings abnormal returns. Portfolio Q5 has an earnings announcement 
abnormal return 94 basis points higher than portfolio Q1 in the first quarter, and this difference is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level (t-statistics = 17.38). The same pattern holds for the next 
three quarters. Although the magnitude of the difference is smaller for the next three quarters, they 
are still statistically significant.  
To the extent that institutions might trade based on past earnings news, the above results may 
be influenced by the well-documented earnings momentum. To control for earnings momentum, each 
quarter we divide all stocks into tertile portfolios based on the current quarter’s earnings 
announcement abnormal return. Next, we calculate the median abnormal return difference between 
the buy and sell portfolios around subsequent quarterly earnings announcements within each current 
earnings announcement abnormal return tertile. We then report the time-series average of these 
return differences across the current earnings announcement abnormal return tertiles to stratify the 
earnings momentum effect. After adjusting for earnings momentum, we find that the earnings 
announcement return difference between Q5 and Q1 remains significant and positive for the first 
three quarters. The adjusted return difference is about 53 basis points annualized, comparable in 
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magnitude to Baker, Litov, Wachter and Wurgler (2004) who examine the relation between mutual 
fund trading and subsequent earnings announcement returns.  
In contrast to short-term institutions, we find no evidence that long-term institutional trading is 
related to future earnings announcement abnormal returns. The difference in earnings announcement 
abnormal returns between Q5 and Q1 is indistinguishable from zero across all four quarters whether 
we control for earnings momentum or not. This result is consistent with our earlier finding that long-
term institutional trading does not forecast future stock returns. 
Next, we examine if institutional trading is related to future earnings surprises. Panel B reports 
the time-series average of median earnings surprises for portfolios Q5 and Q1, as well as the 
difference between Q5 and Q1. Similar to the results for earnings announcement returns, stocks for 
which short-term institutional ownership increases the most experience significantly higher earnings 
surprises (more positive or less negative) than those stocks for which short-term institutional 
ownership decreases the most. This difference is statistically significant for all four quarters after 
portfolio formation. By contrast, we find no evidence that stocks that long-term institutions buy or 
sell exhibit significantly different earnings surprises in any of the subsequent four quarters.8  
In summary, we show in this section that short-term institutional trading is positively 
associated with both future earnings surprises and abnormal returns around subsequent earnings 
announcements. These results provide more direct evidence that short-term institutions possess 
private information about future firm value. Consistent with our results on returns, we find little 
evidence that long-term institutional trading is related to either future earnings surprises or earnings 
announcement abnormal returns.  
 
3.6. Evidence on long-run returns 
We have shown that short-term institutional trading forecasts future returns and contains 
information about future earnings news, which suggest that short-term institutions are informed. An 
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alternative explanation for our results is that short-term institutional investors pressure corporate 
managers to maximize short-run profits at the expense of long-run firm value. Porter (1992) argues 
that the short-term focus by institutional investors force managers to be overly concerned with 
measures of short-term performance such as quarterly earnings. Bushee (2001) shows that transient 
institutions exhibit strong preferences for corporations with more value in expected near-term 
earnings and less in long-run value. Further, Bushee (1998) finds that firms with higher transient 
institutional ownership are more likely to underinvest in long-term, intangible projects such as R&D 
to reverse an earnings decline. 
While the short-term pressure hypothesis might explain the short-run predictive ability of short-
term institutional ownership and trading, it also predicts long-run price reversal for stocks held or 
traded by short-term institutions. Our results for one-year-ahead returns (reported in Tables 4 and 5) 
are inconsistent with this hypothesis: Changes in short-term institutional holdings strongly predict 
next year’s return. However, it is possible that one year is not long enough for prices to reverse to 
their fundamental values. Therefore, in Table 8 we examine the relation between institutional trading 
and future stock returns up to three years. Specifically, we re-estimate regression equation (7) 
replacing the dependent variable by the two-year holding period return starting from one-year from 
the current quarter. In this analysis, since the dependent variable is overlapped, we use Newey-West 
standard errors to account for serial correlation of residuals.  
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
 
Table 8 presents the regression results. If there is long-run price reversal, we would expect the 
coefficients on SIOt and ∆SIOt to be significantly negative.  We find no evidence of long-run price 
reversal. Indeed, the coefficients on SIOt and ∆SIOt are all positive and insignificant. This suggests 
that the stocks held or bought by short-term institutions do not under-perform in the long run. These 
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results confirm that short-term institutional trading predicts future stock returns not because of the 
short-term pressure they create for corporate managers, but because they have an informational 
advantage. Thus, this paper’s main findings cannot be explained by the short-term pressure 
hypothesis.  
Although long-term institutions have no ability to predict short-term returns, it is possible that 
they have superior long-term information (as we discussed in the introduction). Results in Table 8 are 
not consistent with this hypothesis. Neither holdings nor trading by long-term institutions forecast 
long-run returns. Specifically, the coefficients on LIOt-1 and ∆LIOt are not statistically significant at 
any conventional levels. 
In summary, we show in this section that our results are not explained by the short-term 
pressure hypothesis. While we might have overlooked other alternative explanations, the fact that we 
do not find long-run price reversal likely rules out other non-information-based explanations as well: 
If price movements result from something other than information, we would expect to observe 
subsequent return reversals.  
 
3.7. Are our results on long-term institutions driven by index funds?  
Our results indicate that long-term institutional holdings or trading has no explanatory power 
for future stock returns. One possibility is that some long-term institutions in our sample are 
institutions specializing in index funds. Since the primary objective of index funds is to track the 
performance of their respective indexes, they have little incentive to collect information about future 
returns. To examine if index funds drives our results regarding long-term institutions, we conduct 
two tests.  
 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
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In the first test, we split the sample period into two halves. During the first half of our sample 
period, index funds are relatively undeveloped. The average share of index funds among all equity 
funds is only about 1% from 1980 to 1991.9 If long-term institutions can predict future stock returns 
but their predictability is diluted by index funds, we would expect that long-term institutions have 
stronger predictive power during the first half of our sample period. Panel A of Table 9 reports the 
results for the period from 1980 to 1991, and Panel B reports the results for the period from 1992 to 
2003. Our sub-period results are largely similar to those for the entire sample period. Even for the 
first half of our sample period, neither the holdings nor trading by long-term institutions predict 
future stock returns. This is true for both one-quarter-ahead returns and one-year-ahead returns. 
These results suggest that index funds do not drive our results regarding long-term institutions. We 
also note that short-term institutional holdings and trading strongly predict future returns in both sub-
periods. This shows that our main results regarding short-term institutions are robust to alternative 
sample periods.  
 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
 
In the second test, we exclude from our sample those fund families that either have more than 
$1 billion in equity index funds or more than 50% of their total net assets in equity index funds on 
average from 1992 to 2002.10 We then re-estimate regression (7). The results are reported in Table 
10. After excluding families specializing in index funds, we still find no evidence that the holdings or 
trading by long-term institutions predict future stock returns. In summary, these additional tests 
suggest that our results on long-term institutions do not seem to be driven by index funds.  
 
4. Conclusions 
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This paper finds a significant relation between institutions’ investment horizons and their 
informational roles. We show that the positive relation between institutional ownership and future 
stock returns documented in Gompers and Metrick (2001) is driven by short-term institutional 
investors. More importantly, we find strong evidence that changes in short-term institutional 
ownership also predict future returns. By contrast, we find no evidence that long-term institutions’ 
holdings or trading predict future returns. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that short-
term institutions are better informed.  
If short-term institutions have an informational advantage, their advantage should be greater for 
firms with smaller size and more growth opportunities—these firms face more uncertainty and their 
fair value is more difficult to evaluate. Consistent with this intuition, we find that the short-term 
institutions’ predictive power is stronger for small and growth stocks than for large and value stocks. 
We also find that short-term institutions’ trading is significantly positively related to future earnings 
surprises and earnings announcement abnormal returns. These results suggest that short-term 
institutions possess private information about future earnings. 
An alternative explanation for our results is that short-term institutions pressure corporate 
managers to maximize short-run earnings at the expense of long-run firm value. In this case, we 
would expect to find long-run price reversal for stocks held or traded by short-term institutions. We 
do not find support for this explanation: Our analysis of future returns shows no evidence of price 
reversal for up to three years. We also show that long-term institutional trading does not predict stock 
returns in the long-run, inconsistent with the idea that long-term institutions have superior long-term 
information. Overall, our results are most consistent with the view that short-term institutions are 
better informed and that they trade actively to exploit their informational advantage.  
This paper’s results have implications for the issue of identifying and attracting the “right” 
investors. Recent studies (e.g., Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005)) suggest that short-term 
institutional investors are weak monitors. Moreover, short-term institutions pressure managers into a 
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short-term focus, thereby hurting long-run firm value (e.g., Bushee (1998)). Collectively, these 
results suggest that it might be beneficial for firms to target and attract long-term institutional 
investors (Porter (1992), Brancato (1997), and Bushee (2004)). We argue that firms should also 
consider the informational aspect of institutional ownership. Our results indicate that short-term 
institutions play a significant informational role in the stock market. Since more informative prices 
facilitate better financing and investment decisions and may reduce cost of capital, our results cast 
doubt on the benefit of a strategy that attempts to attract only long-term investors. 
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Footnotes 
1  For institutional preferences, see e.g., Del Guercio (1996), Falkenstein (1996), Gompers and 
Metrick (2001), and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003). For institutional trading patterns such herding 
and momentum trading and its impact on stock returns, see e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1992), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Wermers (1999), 
Badrinath, and Wahal (2001), Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003), 
Sias (2003), Cai and Zheng (2004), Sias (2004), Sias (2005), and Sias, Starks, Titman (2005). 
2 Recent accounting literature (Ke and Petroni (2004)) provides evidence that transient institutional 
investors can predict a break in a string of consecutive quarterly earnings increase, suggesting that 
short-term institutions are informed. 
3 Gompers and Metrick (2001) argue that since the institutional holdings are fairly stable over time, 
the lagged institutional holdings should be almost as good a proxy for temporal demand shocks as 
current institutional ownership. At the same time, changes in the institutional holdings are a more 
precise measure of informational advantage. See Gompers and Metrick (2001) for a detailed 
discussion. 
4 Consistent with our finding, Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) provide evidence that long-term 
institutional investors do not possess private information about long-run earnings growth. 
5 Several papers examine the relation between portfolio turnover and mutual fund performance. 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989) find a positive relation between turnover and pre-expense portfolio 
performance, while Carhart (1997) finds that fund turnover is negatively related to net fund returns. 
Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) show that, unlike our study, both high and low turnover 
mutual funds have stock picking skills—the stocks they buy outperform those they sell. Moreover, 
they find little difference in skills between high and low turnover funds based on their trading. 
6 Alexander, Cici, and Gibson (2004) show that investor flow-induced trading contains little 
information. 
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7 One should not interpret this result as evidence that long-term institutional ownership has negative 
predictive ability for future returns. We note that the coefficient on LIO captures only the marginal 
effect of long-term institutional ownership. In particular, the total institutional ownership, which also 
contains long-term institutional ownership, has a positive relation with future stock returns, 
Therefore, the total effect of long-term institutional ownership is likely indistinguishable from zero. 
8 Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) also examine the relation between changes in institutional 
ownership and future earnings news. They focus on the revision of long-term earnings forecast. They 
find no evidence that dedicated institutions have private information about long-term earnings, and 
transient institutions seem to possess information about long-term earnings that will be reflected in 
short-term stock prices. 
9 We calculate the share of index funds using data from the CRSP survivor-bias free mutual fund 
database. We identify index funds by searching the word “index” in fund names.  
10 We identify these fund families using data from the CRSP survivor-bias free mutual fund database. 
Since the CRSP database does not report information on fund management company prior to 1992, 
our calculation starts from 1992. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Time-Series Statistics of Cross-Sectional Averages    
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation
Total Institutional Ownership – IO (%) 25.10 24.85 38.73 15.71 6.13
Short-term Institutional Ownership – SIO (%) 7.91 8.12 11.46 5.47 1.58
Long-term Institutional Ownership – LIO (%) 6.56 6.78 9.85 2.95 1.71
Market Capitalization – MKTCAP ($million) 961.44 682.59 2,468.60 312.88 659.54
Age (months) 147.09 145.04 171.08 131.14 11.34
Dividend Yield – DP (%) 2.21 2.10 3.48 1.65 0.46
Book-to-Market – BM 0.74 0.69 1.35 0.43 0.20
Price – PRC ($) 21.33 19.26 35.90 13.20 5.21
Turnover – TURN (%) 7.80 7.27 18.14 3.01 3.11
Volatility – VOL (%) 13.59 12.88 18.78 11.18 2.01
Lagged three-month Return – RETt-3, t (%) 4.19 3.55 32.22 -29.17 11.38
Lagged nine-month Return – RETt-12, t-3 (%) 13.58 12.96 93.90 -25.68 20.96
Number of Stocks 5,911 5,941 7,759 3,453 1,212
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Panel B: Time-Series Mean  of Cross-Sectional Correlations Between Institutional Ownership and Stock Characteristics 
 MKTCAP AGE DP BM PRC TURN VOL SP500 RETt-3, t RETt-12, t-3
IO 0.20 0.30 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.19 -0.24 0.39 0.02 0.06
SIO 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.31 -0.08 0.20 0.04 0.12
LIO 0.22 0.38 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.01 -0.23 0.40 0.00 0.00
    
Panel C: Time-Series Mean of Cross-Sectional Correlations Between Stock Characteristics 
 MKTCAP AGE DP BM PRC TURN VOL SP500 RET-3,0 RET-12,-3
MKTCAP 1.00   
AGE 0.31 1.00  
DP 0.03 0.10 1.00  
BM -0.02 0.05 0.68 1.00  
PRC 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.00 1.00  
TURN -0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.04 0.01 1.00 
VOL -0.12 -0.24 -0.20 -0.02 -0.10 0.24 1.00
SP500 0.44 0.50 0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.17 1.00
RETt-3, t 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.00 1.00
RETt-12, t-3 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.02 1.00
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics. The sample period is from 1980:Q3 to 2003:Q4. Institutional holdings are obtained from Thomson 
Financial. Stock characteristics are from the CRSP and Compustat database. IO is total institutional ownership. SIO is short-term institutional 
ownership. LIO is long-term institutional ownership. An institutional investor is classified as short-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate 
ranks in the top tertile. An institutional investor is classified as long-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile. 
MKTCAP is market capitalization. Age is firm age measured as number of months since first return appears in the CRSP database. DP is dividend 
yield. DP is winsorized at the 99th percentile. BM is book-to-market ratio. BM is winsorized at the 1st percentile and 99th percentile. PRC is share 
price. TURN is the average monthly turnover over the previous quarter. VOL is the monthly volatility over the past two years. SP500 is a dummy 
variable for S&P 500 index membership. RETt-3, t is the lagged three-month return. RETt-12, t-3 is the lagged nine-month return preceding the 
beginning of the quarter. Panel A presents the time-series mean, median, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation of the quarterly cross-
sectional averages. Panel B presents the time-series average of the cross-sectional correlations between institutional ownership and stock 
characteristics. Panel C presents the time-series average of the cross-sectional correlations between stock characteristics. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of Institutional Ownership and Trading 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Institutional Ownership 
 Total Institutional Ownership 
Short-term 
Institutional Ownership 
Long-term 
Institutional Ownership 
 Average Coefficient 
[+ significant, 
- significant] 
Average 
Coefficient 
[+ significant, 
- significant] 
Average 
Coefficient 
[+ significant, 
- significant] 
Market Capitalization 0.045 [94, 0] 0.017 [93, 1] 0.009 [89, 0] 
Age 0.009 [61, 9] -0.006 [1, 63] 0.014 [81, 3] 
Dividend Yield -0.316 [0, 92] -0.208 [0, 92] -0.005 [27, 30] 
Book-to-Market 0.087 [94, 0] 0.023 [94, 0] 0.024 [93, 0] 
Price 0.072 [94, 0] 0.022 [94, 0] 0.021 [92, 0] 
Turnover 0.579 [93, 0] 0.419 [94, 0] -0.003 [34, 16] 
Volatility 0.020 [31, 14] 0.041 [56, 10] 0.017 [32, 8] 
S&P 500 0.035 [58, 16] -0.014 [30, 44] 0.040 [90, 0] 
RETt-3, t -0.055 [2, 84] -0.014 [5, 61] -0.014 [0, 70] 
RETt-12, t-3 -0.030 [2, 78] 0.001 [25, 21] -0.012 [1, 86] 
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Panel B: Determinants of Institutional Trading 
 Total Institutional Trading 
Short-term 
Institutional Trading 
Long-term 
Institutional Trading 
 Average Coefficient 
[+ significant, 
- significant] 
Average 
Coefficient 
[+ significant, 
- significant] 
Average 
Coefficient 
[+ significant, 
- significant] 
Market 
Capitalization×100  0.067 [30, 12] 0.001 [17, 19] 0.041 [32, 13] 
Age×100 -0.066 [7, 26] -0.008 [15, 11] -0.054 [21, 29] 
Dividend Yield×100 -0.252 [23, 25] -0.358 [19, 18] -0.630 [26, 28] 
Book-to-Market×100 0.010 [22, 17] 0.017 [17, 17] 0.055 [34, 19] 
Price×100 0.054 [17, 13] -0.027 [7, 18] 0.066 [31, 17] 
Turnover -0.018 [11, 45] 0.011 [11, 47] -0.002 [16, 16] 
Volatility 0.011 [17, 3] 0.001 [17, 7] -0.002 [12, 6] 
S&P 500 -0.003 [12, 31] 0.000 [11, 16] -0.001 [24, 28] 
RETt-3, t 0.016 [83, 0] 0.013 [87, 0] 0.001 [12, 3] 
RETt-12, t-3 0.004 [40, 1] 0.001 [25, 5] 0.000 [12, 3] 
 
This table summarizes the results of cross-sectional regressions of institutional ownership and institutional trading on stock characteristics. The 
sample period is from 1980:Q3 to 2003:Q4. Institutional holdings are obtained from Thomson Financial. Stock characteristics are from the CRSP 
and Compustat database. An institutional investor is classified as short-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the top tertile. An 
institutional investor is classified as long-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile. Age is firm age measured as 
number of months since first return appears in the CRSP database. Dividend yield is winsorized at the 99th percentile. Book-to-market ratio is 
winsorized at the 1st percentile and 99th percentile. Turnover is the average monthly turnover over the previous quarter. Volatility is the monthly 
volatility over the past two years. S&P 500 is a dummy variable for S&P 500 index membership. RETt-3, t is the lagged three-month return. RETt-12, 
t-3 is the lagged nine-month return preceding the beginning of the quarter. All variables except institutional ownership, S&P 500 index membership, 
and lagged returns are expressed in natural logarithms. We estimate a cross-sectional regression each quarter. We report the average regression 
coefficient. In brackets, we report the number of coefficients that are positive (and negative) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. All 
returns are in percent. 
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Table 3 
Institutional Ownership and Future Stock Returns 
 
 Dependent Variable – RETt, t+3  Dependent Variable – RETt, t+12 
Intercept 0.114 (0.01) 0.114 (0.01) 0.114 (0.01) 0.477 (0.01) 0.476 (0.01) 0.477 (0.01)
IO 0.019 (0.01) 0.004 (0.61) 0.023 (0.01) 0.058 (0.02) 0.013 (0.60) 0.071 (0.01)
SIO  0.054 (0.01) 0.142 (0.01)
LIO  -0.021 (0.05) -0.055 (0.07)
BM 0.007 (0.01) 0.007 (0.01) 0.007 (0.01) 0.034 (0.01) 0.035 (0.01) 0.035 (0.01)
MKTCAP -0.006 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) -0.023 (0.01) -0.023 (0.01) -0.023 (0.01)
VOL -0.023 (0.70) -0.025 (0.68) -0.024 (0.69) -0.161 (0.50) -0.166 (0.49) -0.162 (0.50)
TURN -0.104 (0.01) -0.117 (0.01) -0.108 (0.01) -0.396 (0.01) -0.442 (0.01) -0.409 (0.01)
PRC -0.008 (0.04) -0.008 (0.04) -0.008 (0.04) -0.020 (0.24) -0.020 (0.24) -0.020 (0.24)
SP500 0.016 (0.01) 0.017 (0.01) 0.017 (0.01) 0.058 (0.01) 0.061 (0.01) 0.059 (0.01)
RETt-3, t 0.004 (0.69) 0.004 (0.70) 0.004 (0.69) 0.109 (0.01) 0.109 (0.01) 0.109 (0.01)
RETt-12, t-3 0.022 (0.01) 0.022 (0.01) 0.022 (0.01) 0.034 (0.01) 0.033 (0.01) 0.034 (0.01)
AGE 0.002 (0.07) 0.003 (0.03) 0.002 (0.06) 0.003 (0.47) 0.004 (0.31) 0.003 (0.41)
DP -0.026 (0.35) -0.022 (0.42) -0.024 (0.37) -0.128 (0.25) -0.116 (0.30) -0.126 (0.26)
Avg. R2 0.080 0.081 0.080 0.078 0.079 0.078
 
This table summarizes the results of cross-sectional regressions of one-quarter-ahead or one-year-ahead returns on institutional ownership and 
other stock characteristics. The sample period is from 1980:Q3 to 2003:Q4. Institutional holdings are obtained from Thomson Financial. Stock 
characteristics are from the CRSP and Compustat database. RETt, t+3 is one-quarter-ahead stock return. RETt, t+12 is one-year-ahead stock return. IO 
is total institutional ownership. SIO is short-term institutional ownership. LIO is long-term institutional ownership. An institutional investor is 
classified as short-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the top tertile. An institutional investor is classified as long-term 
investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile. MKTCAP is market capitalization. Age is firm age measured as number of 
months since first return appears in the CRSP database. DP is dividend yield. DP is winsorized at the 99th percentile. BM is book-to-market ratio. 
BM is winsorized at the 1st percentile and 99th percentile. PRC is share price. TURN is the average monthly turnover over the previous quarter. 
VOL is the monthly volatility over the past two years. SP500 is dummy variable for S&P 500 index membership. RETt-3, t is the lagged three-
month return. RETt-12, t-3 is the lagged nine-month return preceding the beginning of the quarter. All variables except institutional ownership, S&P 
500 index membership, and stock returns are expressed in natural logarithms. We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology and report the 
time-series average regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are p-values based on Newey-West standard errors. Regression coefficients on 
institutional ownership that are statistically significant at the 5 percent levels are in bold. All returns are in percent. 
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Table 4 
Short-term Institutional Investors, Long-term Institutional Investors, and Future Stock Returns 
 
 Dependent Variable – RETt, t+3  Dependent Variable – RETt, t+12 
Intercept 0.115 (0.01) 0.119 (0.01) 0.479 (0.01) 0.472 (0.01)
SIOt 0.058 (0.01) 0.157 (0.01) 
LIOt 0.004 (0.68) 0.024 (0.45) 
SIOt-1  0.043 (0.01)  0.135 (0.01)
LIOt-1  0.016 (0.10)  0.032 (0.32)
∆SIOt  0.062 (0.01)  0.192 (0.01)
∆LIOt  -0.021 (0.12)  -0.006 (0.87)
BM 0.007 (0.01) 0.007 (0.01) 0.035 (0.01) 0.036 (0.01)
MKTCAP -0.006 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) -0.023 (0.01) -0.023 (0.01)
VOL -0.026 (0.67) -0.036 (0.56) -0.168 (0.48) -0.150 (0.53)
TURN -0.117 (0.01) -0.114 (0.01) -0.441 (0.01) -0.436 (0.01)
PRC -0.008 (0.04) -0.008 (0.03) -0.020 (0.24) -0.020 (0.25)
SP500 0.017 (0.01) 0.017 (0.01) 0.060 (0.01) 0.059 (0.01)
RETt-3, t 0.004 (0.70) 0.002 (0.84) 0.110 (0.01) 0.108 (0.01)
RETt-12, t-3 0.022 (0.01) 0.021 (0.01) 0.033 (0.01) 0.033 (0.01)
AGE 0.002 (0.04) 0.002 (0.05) 0.004 (0.33) 0.004 (0.40)
DP -0.022 (0.42) -0.022 (0.42) -0.119 (0.29) -0.120 (0.30)
Avg. R2 0.081 0.083 0.078 0.080
 
This table summarizes the results of cross-sectional regressions of one-quarter-ahead or one-year-ahead 
returns on short-term and long-term institutional ownership, and other stock characteristics.  The sample 
period is from 1980:Q3 to 2003:Q4. Institutional holdings are obtained from Thomson Financial. Stock 
characteristics are from the CRSP and Compustat database. RETt, t+3 is one-quarter-ahead stock return. RETt, 
t+12 is one-year-ahead stock return. IO is total institutional ownership. SIO is short-term institutional 
ownership. LIO is long-term institutional ownership. An institutional investor is classified as short-term 
investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the top tertile. An institutional investor is classified as 
long-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile. MKTCAP is market 
capitalization. Age is firm age measured as number of months since first return appears in the CRSP 
database. DP is dividend yield. DP is winsorized at the 99th percentile. BM is book-to-market ratio. BM is 
winsorized at the 1st percentile and 99th percentile. PRC is share price. TURN is the average monthly 
turnover over the previous quarter. VOL is the monthly volatility over the past two years. SP500 is dummy 
variable for S&P 500 index membership. RETt-3, t is the lagged three-month return. RETt-12, t-3 is the lagged 
nine-month return preceding the beginning of the quarter. All variables except institutional ownership, S&P 
500 index membership, and stock returns are expressed in natural logarithms. We estimate cross-sectional 
regressions for each quarter. We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology and report the time-series 
average regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are p-values based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Regression coefficients on institutional ownership and trading that are statistically significant at the 5 
percent levels are in bold. All returns are in percent. 
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Table 5 
Short-term Institutional Investors, Long-term Institutional Investors, and Future Stock Returns: 
Small/Large and Value/Growth 
 
Panel A: Small/Large Stocks 
 Dependent Variable – RETt, t+3  Dependent Variable – RETt, t+12 
 Small Large  Small Large 
Intercept 0.142 (0.01) 0.052 (0.05) 0.589 (0.01) 0.180 (0.02)
SIOt-1 0.057 (0.01) 0.031 (0.03) 0.200 (0.01) 0.046 (0.42)
LIOt-1 0.024 (0.06) 0.017 (0.09) 0.113 (0.01) 0.039 (0.24)
∆SIOt 0.087 (0.01) 0.047 (0.03) 0.266 (0.01) 0.191 (0.01)
∆LIOt -0.029 (0.07) -0.008 (0.64) 0.030 (0.54) -0.009 (0.86)
BM 0.011 (0.01) 0.011 (0.06) 0.051 (0.01) 0.055 (0.01)
MKTCAP -0.009 (0.01) -0.001 (0.35) -0.34 (0.01) -0.005 (0.55)
VOL -0.011 (0.85) -0.119 (0.19) -0.031 (0.88) -0.211 (0.52)
TURN -0.115 (0.01) -0.057 (0.06) -0.510 (0.01) -0.120 (0.35)
PRC -0.01 (0.07) -0.002 (0.47) -0.021 (0.36) 0.002 (0.85)
SP500 0.011 (0.06) 0.003 (0.28) 0.047 (0.02) 0.013 (0.17)
RETt-3, t 0.005 (0.55) -0.002 (0.88) 0.119 (0.01) 0.120 (0.01)
RETt-12, t-3 0.022 (0.01) 0.032 (0.01) 0.033 (0.02) 0.061 (0.01)
AGE 0.002 (0.13) 0.001 (0.79) 0.000 (0.98) 0.001 (0.95)
DP -0.013 (0.11) 0.005 (0.82) -0.072 (0.06) -0.046 (0.60)
Avg. R2 0.075 0.141 0.071 0.135
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Panel B: Value/Growth Stocks 
 Dependent Variable – RETt, t+3  Dependent Variable – RETt, t+12 
 Value Growth  Value Growth 
Intercept 0.084 (0.01) 0.118 (0.01) 0.436 (0.01) 0.416 (0.01)
SIOt-1 0.016 (0.27) 0.077 (0.01) 0.045 (0.40) 0.223 (0.01)
LIOt-1 0.013 (0.19) 0.044 (0.01) 0.014 (0.67) 0.180 (0.01)
∆SIOt 0.040 (0.03) 0.103 (0.01) 0.119 (0.07) 0.352 (0.01)
∆LIOt -0.029 (0.07) -0.029 (0.28) -0.041 (0.44) 0.087 (0.11)
BM 0.015 (0.01) 0.002 (0.84) 0.034 (0.09) 0.020 (0.63)
MKTCAP -0.004 (0.01) -0.007 (0.01) -0.019 (0.01) -0.023 (0.01)
VOL 0.036 (0.56) -0.047 (0.46) 0.162 (0.49) -0.122 (0.59)
TURN -0.104 (0.01) -0.116 (0.01) -0.406 (0.01) -0.445 (0.01)
PRC -0.010 (0.01) -0.006 (0.15) -0.027 (0.14) -0.007 (0.65)
SP500 0.015 (0.01) 0.015 (0.01) 0.057 (0.01) 0.045 (0.01)
RETt-3, t -0.009 (0.37) 0.014 (0.16) 0.117 (0.01) 0.120 (0.01)
RETt-12, t-3 0.029 (0.01) 0.022 (0.01) 0.043 (0.02) 0.041 (0.01)
AGE 0.003 (0.03) 0.002 (0.33) 0.002 (0.57) 0.002 (0.75)
DP -0.012 (0.12) 0.057 (0.15) -0.034 (0.28) 0.245 (0.12)
Avg. R2 0.092 0.077 0.094 0.067
 
This table summarizes the results of cross-sectional regressions of one-quarter-ahead or one-year-ahead 
returns on short-term and long-term institutional ownership, and other stock characteristics for small/large, 
and value/growth stocks separately. The sample period is from 1980:Q3 to 2003:Q4. Institutional holdings 
are obtained from Thomson Financial. Stock characteristics are from the CRSP and Compustat database. 
Large stocks have market capitalization greater than that of the median NYSE stock. Small stocks have 
market capitalization less than that of the median NYSE stock. RETt, t+3 is one-quarter-ahead stock return. 
RETt, t+12 is one-year-ahead stock return. IO is total institutional ownership. SIO is short-term institutional 
ownership. LIO is long-term institutional ownership. An institutional investor is classified as short-term 
investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the top tertile. An institutional investor is classified as 
long-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile. MKTCAP is market 
capitalization. Age is firm age measured as number of months since first return appears in the CRSP 
database. DP is dividend yield. DP is winsorized at the 99th percentile. BM is book-to-market ratio. BM is 
winsorized at the 1st percentile and 99th percentile. PRC is share price. TURN is the average monthly 
turnover over the previous quarter. VOL is the monthly volatility over the past two years. SP500 is dummy 
variable for S&P 500 index membership. RETt-3, t is the lagged three-month return. RETt-12, t-3 is the lagged 
nine-month return preceding the beginning of the quarter. All variables except institutional ownership, S&P 
500 index membership, and stock returns are expressed in natural logarithms. We estimate cross-sectional 
regressions for each quarter. We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology and report the time-series 
average regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are p-values based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Regression coefficients on institutional ownership and trading that are statistically significant at the 5 
percent levels are in bold. All returns are in percent. 
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Table 6 
Returns on Portfolios Sorted by Changes in Short- and Long-term Institutional Ownership 
 
  Quarters 
 Quarterly 
Average
t+1 t+1 
through t+2
t+1 
through t+3 
t+1 
through t+4
Short-term 
Institutional Trading Portfolios 
 
      Q5 3.62 3.61 6.91 10.61 14.88
      Q1 3.09 2.97 5.86 8.74 12.72
      Q5 – Q1 0.53 0.64 1.05 1.87 2.16
 (3.16) (2.02) (2.42) (3.16) (2.77)
      Q5 – Q1 (DGTW adjusted) 0.41 0.42 0.62 1.24 1.62
 (3.34) (1.73) (1.86) (2.74) (2.82)
Long-term 
Institutional Trading Portfolios  
      Q5 3.21 2.91 5.90 9.08 13.27
      Q1 3.40 3.08 6.55 10.18 14.02
      Q5 – Q1 -0.19 -0.17 -0.64 -1.09 -0.75
 (-1.20) (-0.49) (-1.52) (-2.25) (-1.41)
      Q5 – Q1 (DGTW adjusted) -0.03 -0.04 -0.35 -0.55 -0.16
 (-0.29) (-0.16) (-1.12) (-1.52) (-0.41)
 
This table reports the returns on portfolios sorted by the quarterly change in short- and long-term 
institutional ownership. The sample period is from 1980:Q3 to 2003:Q4. Institutional holdings are obtained 
from CDA/Spectrum. Stock returns are from the CRSP. An institutional investor is classified as a short-
term investor if its past 4-quarter portfolio turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile.  Each quarter, we groups 
all stocks available in CDA/Spectrum into 5 portfolios based on their rankings on change in short- and long-
term institutional ownership, respectively. Portfolio Q5 contains stocks which experience the largest 
increase in institutional ownership. Portfolio Q1 contains stocks which experience the largest decrease in 
institutional ownership. For each of portfolios Q5 and Q1, we report their value-weighted cumulative 
quarterly returns up to 4 quarters after the portfolio formation. We also report the average quarterly returns 
on an investment strategy that is long in Q5 and short in Q1. We report the time-series means of both raw 
returns as well as the Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997 DGTW) benchmark adjusted returns. 
The returns are in percentages. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Return differences that are 
statistically significant at 10 percent are in bold. All returns are in percent. 
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Table 7 
Institutional Trading and Future Earnings News 
 
Panel A: Cumulative Market-adjusted Return over [-1,+1] Around Earnings Announcement (%) 
 Quarters 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Short-term Institutional Trading Portfolios  
             Q5 0.586 0.123 0.131 0.067
             Q1 -0.351 -0.006 0.018 0.000
             Q5 – Q1 0.938 0.128 0.113 0.066
 (17.38) (3.66) (3.23) (1.83)
             Q5 – Q1 (earnings mom. adj.) 0.133 0.121 0.071 -0.006
 (4.15) (3.63) (2.04) (-0.20)
Long-term Institutional Trading Portfolios  
             Q5 0.074 0.075 0.076 0.055
             Q1 0.096 0.089 0.062 0.060
             Q5 – Q1 -0.022 -0.015 0.014 -0.005
 (-0.67) (-0.45) (0.47) (-0.15)
             Q5 – Q1 (earnings mom. adj.) -0.014 0.008 -0.003 -0.005
 (-0.53) (0.30) (-0.11) (-0.15)
Panel B: Earnings Surprises (%) 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Short-term Institutional Trading Portfolios  
             Q5 0.047 0.003 -0.003 -0.004
             Q1 -0.029 -0.024 -0.019 -0.017
             Q5 – Q1 0.076 0.027 0.016 0.013
 (2.03) (7.02) (5.36) (5.42)
Long-term Institutional Trading Portfolios  
             Q5 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009
             Q1 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 -0.008
             Q5 – Q1 0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.000
 (1.31) (0.44) (-0.80) (-0.15)
 
This table reports the earnings announcement abnormal returns and earnings surprises by institutional 
trading portfolios. The sample period is from 1980:Q3 to 2003:Q4 for Panel A, and is 1984:Q1 to 2003:Q4 
for Panel B. Institutional holdings are obtained from Thomson Financial. Stock characteristics are from the 
CRSP and Compustat database. An institutional investor is classified as short-term investor if its past 4-
quarter turnover rate ranks in the top tertile. An institutional investor is classified as long-term investors if 
its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile. The earnings announcement abnormal return is 
calculated for the three days around the earnings announcement date. The earnings surprise is calculated as 
the difference between actual earnings and consensus analyst forecast divided by the stock price. Earnings 
data are from I/B/E/S. Earnings announcement dates are obtained from the Compustat. We divide stocks 
into quintile portfolios based on the changes of quarterly institutional ownership. Portfolio Q5 contains 
stocks which experience the largest increase in institutional ownership. Portfolio Q1 contains stocks which 
experience the largest decrease in institutional ownership. We report the time-series mean of cross-sectional 
median values for these portfolios. Panel A reports the results for earnings announcement abnormal returns, 
and Panel B reports those for earnings surprises. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Differences in 
returns or earnings surprises that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level are in bold. 
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Table 8 
Short-term Institutional Investors, Long-term Institutional Investors, and Long-run Stock 
Returns 
 
                                            Dependent Variable – RETt+12, t+36 
Intercept 0.569 (0.01) 0.545 (0.01)
SIOt 0.076 (0.18)
LIOt 0.012 (0.82)
SIOt-1 0.055 (0.34)
LIOt-1 0.037 (0.42)
∆SIOt 0.018 (0.74)
∆LIOt 0.007 (0.84)
BM 0.072 (0.01) 0.068 (0.01)
MKTCAP -0.028 (0.01) -0.027 (0.01)
VOL -0.405 (0.26) -0.392 (0.28)
TURN -0.359 (0.08) -0.347 (0.10)
PRC 0.030 (0.16) 0.032 (0.15)
SP500 0.048 (0.12) 0.046 (0.02)
RETt-3, t -0.036 (0.29) -0.040 (0.27)
RETt-12, t-3 -0.023 (0.39) -0.022 (0.42)
AGE 0.003 (0.74) 0.003 (0.81)
DP -0.172 (0.45) -0.134 (0.56)
Avg. R2 0.050 0.050
 
This table summarizes the results of cross-sectional regressions of long-run stock returns on short-term and 
long-term institutional ownership, and other stock characteristics. The sample period is from 1980:Q3 to 
2002:Q4. The institutional holdings are obtained from Thomson Financial. The stock characteristics are 
from the CRSP and Compustat database. RETt+12, t+36 is the 2-year cumulative return beginning one year 
from the report date. IO is total institutional ownership. SIO is short-term institutional ownership. LIO is 
long-term institutional ownership. An institutional investor is classified as short-term investors if its past 4-
quarter turnover rate ranks in the top tertile. An institutional investor is classified as long-term investors if 
its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile. MKTCAP is market capitalization. Age is firm 
age measured as number of months since first return appears in the CRSP database. DP is dividend yield. 
DP is winsorized at the 99th percentile. BM is book-to-market ratio. BM is winsorized at the 1st percentile 
and 99th percentile. PRC is share price. TURN is the average monthly turnover over the previous quarter. 
VOL is the monthly volatility over the past two years. SP500 is dummy variable for S&P 500 index 
membership. RETt-3, t is the lagged three-month return. RETt-12, t-3 is the lagged nine-month return preceding 
the beginning of the quarter. All variables except institutional ownership, S&P 500 index membership, and 
stock returns are expressed in natural logarithms. We estimate cross-sectional regressions for each quarter. 
We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology and report the time-series average regression 
coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are p-values based on Newey-West standard errors. Regression 
coefficients on institutional ownership and trading that are statistically significant at the 5 percent levels are 
in bold. All returns are in percent. 
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Table 9 
Short-term Institutional Investors, Long-term Institutional Investors, and Future Stock Returns: 
Subperiods 
 
Panel A: 1980 – 1991 
 Dependent Variable – RETt, t+3  Dependent Variable – RETt, t+12 
Intercept 0.100 (0.01) 0.107 (0.01) 0.400 (0.01) 0.386 (0.01)
SIOt 0.077 (0.01) 0.189 (0.01) 
LIOt -0.007 (0.63) 0.001 (0.99) 
SIOt-1  0.049 (0.01)  0.157 (0.02)
LIOt-1  0.005 (0.67)  -0.005 (0.91)
∆SIOt  0.062 (0.02)  0.223 (0.01)
∆LIOt  0.006 (0.72)  0.037 (0.32)
BM 0.005 (0.09) 0.005 (0.07) 0.021 (0.01) 0.021 (0.03)
MKTCAP -0.007 (0.01) -0.008 (0.01) -0.029 (0.01) -0.028 (0.01)
VOL -0.062 (0.47) -0.081 (0.37) -0.306 (0.35) -0.269 (0.41)
TURN -0.185 (0.01) -0.186 (0.01) -0.689 (0.01) -0.694 (0.01)
PRC 0.002 (0.61) 0.001 (0.77) 0.022 (0.23) 0.023 (0.22)
SP500 0.017 (0.01) 0.017 (0.01) 0.059 (0.01) 0.058 (0.01)
RET-3,0 0.003 (0.84) -0.001 (0.97) 0.121 (0.01) 0.120 (0.01)
RET-12,-3 0.028 (0.01) 0.028 (0.01) 0.060 (0.01) 0.060 (0.01)
AGE 0.003 (0.06) 0.003 (0.05) 0.008 (0.17) 0.008 (0.18)
DP 0.018 (0.70) 0.025 (0.61) 0.123 (0.49) 0.142 (0.45)
Avg. R2 0.082 0.084 0.089 0.090
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Panel B: 1992-2003 
 Dependent Variable – RETt, t+3  Dependent Variable – RETt, t+12 
Intercept 0.129 (0.01) 0.130 (0.01) 0.555 (0.01) 0.553 (0.01)
SIOt 0.040 (0.02) 0.126 (0.05) 
LIOt 0.016 (0.29) 0.046 (0.37) 
SIOt-1  0.036 (0.03)  0.114 (0.10)
LIOt-1  0.027 (0.09)  0.067 (0.15)
∆SIOt  0.062 (0.01)  0.162 (0.08)
∆LIOt  -0.047 (0.03)  -0.047 (0.46)
BM 0.009 (0.01) 0.010 (0.01) 0.048 (0.01) 0.049 (0.01)
MKTCAP -0.005 (0.01) -0.005 (0.01) -0.019 (0.01) -0.018 (0.01)
VOL 0.009 (0.92) 0.006 (0.95) -0.035 (0.92) -0.037 (0.91)
TURN -0.051 (0.15) -0.046 (0.20) -0.204 (0.03) -0.193 (0.05)
PRC -0.018 (0.01) -0.018 (0.01) -0.060 (0.01) -0.060 (0..01)
SP500 0.018 (0.01) 0.017 (0.01) 0.062 (0.01) 0.060 (0.01)
RET-3,0 0.004 (0.73) 0.004 (0.73) 0.099 (0.01) 0.097 (0.01)
RET-12,-3 0.015 (0.01) 0.015 (0.01) 0.007 (0.60) 0.007 (0.59)
AGE 0.002 (0.36) 0.001 (0.41) -0.000 (0.99) -0.001 (0.91)
DP -0.060 (0.03) -0.067 (0.02) -0.350 (0.01) -0.365 (0.01)
Avg. R2 0.080 0.081 0.068 0.070
 
This table summarizes the results of cross-sectional regressions of one-quarter-ahead or one-year-ahead 
returns on short-term and long-term institutional ownership, and other stock characteristics.  The sample 
period is from 1980 to 1991 in Panel A and is from 1992 to 2003 in Panel B. Institutional holdings are 
obtained from Thomson Financial. Stock characteristics are from the CRSP and Compustat database. RETt, 
t+3 is one-quarter-ahead stock return. RETt, t+12 is one-year-ahead stock return. IO is total institutional 
ownership. SIO is short-term institutional ownership. LIO is long-term institutional ownership. An 
institutional investor is classified as short-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the top 
tertile. An institutional investor is classified as long-term investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in 
the bottom tertile. MKTCAP is market capitalization. Age is firm age measured as number of months since 
first return appears in the CRSP database. DP is dividend yield. DP is winsorized at the 99th percentile. BM 
is book-to-market ratio. BM is winsorized at the 1st percentile and 99th percentile. PRC is share price. 
TURN is the average monthly turnover over the previous quarter. VOL is the monthly volatility over the 
past two years. SP500 is dummy variable for S&P 500 index membership. RETt-3, t is the lagged three-
month return. RETt-12, t-3 is the lagged nine-month return preceding the beginning of the quarter. All 
variables except institutional ownership, S&P 500 index membership, and stock returns are expressed in 
natural logarithms. We estimate cross-sectional regressions for each quarter. We use the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) methodology and report the time-series average regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are 
p-values based on Newey-West standard errors.  We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. 
Regression coefficients on institutional ownership and trading that are statistically significant at the 5 
percent levels are in bold. All returns are in percent. 
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Table 10 
Short-term Institutional Investors, Long-term Institutional Investors, and Future Stock Returns: 
Excluding Fund Families that Specialize in Index Funds 
 
 Dependent Variable – RETt, t+3  Dependent Variable – RETt, t+12 
Intercept 0.113 (0.01) 0.117 (0.01) 0.475 (0.01) 0.467 (0.01)
SIOt 0.060 (0.01) 0.164 (0.01) 
LIOt 0.002 (0.68) 0.016 (0.56) 
SIOt-1  0.045 (0.01)  0.142 (0.01)
LIOt-1  0.012 (0.15)  0.022 (0.43)
∆SIOt  0.064 (0.01)  0.192 (0.01)
∆LIOt  -0.018 (0.19)  -0.005 (0.89)
BM 0.007 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01) 0.035 (0.01) 0.035 (0.01)
MKTCAP -0.006 (0.01) -0.006 (0.01) -0.023 (0.01) -0.022 (0.01)
VOL -0.026 (0.67) -0.037 (0.55) -0.165 (0.49) -0.149 (0.54)
TURN -0.116 (0.01) -0.113 (0.01) -0.439 (0.01) -0.434 (0.01)
PRC -0.008 (0.04) -0.008 (0.03) -0.020 (0.25) -0.019 (0.25)
SP500 0.017 (0.01) 0.017 (0.01) 0.061 (0.01) 0.059 (0.01)
RETt-3, t 0.004 (0.69) 0.002 (0.83) 0.110 (0.01) 0.109 (0.01)
RETt-12, t-3 0.022 (0.01) 0.021 (0.01) 0.033 (0.01) 0.033 (0.01)
AGE 0.003 (0.03) 0.003 (0.03) 0.004 (0.32) 0.004 (0.38)
DP -0.021 (0.45) -0.023 (0.42) -0.116 (0.30) -0.119 (0.30)
Avg. R2 0.081 0.083 0.078 0.080
 
This table summarizes the results of cross-sectional regressions of one-quarter-ahead or one-year-ahead 
returns on short-term and long-term institutional ownership, and other stock characteristics.  The sample 
period is from 1980:Q3 to 2003:Q4. Institutional holdings are obtained from Thomson Financial. Stock 
characteristics are from the CRSP and Compustat database. We exclude from our sample those fund 
families that either has more than $1 billion in equity index funds or more than 50% of their total net assets 
in equity index funds on average from 1992-2002. RETt, t+3 is one-quarter-ahead stock return. RETt, t+12 is 
one-year-ahead stock return. IO is total institutional ownership. SIO is short-term institutional ownership. 
LIO is long-term institutional ownership. An institutional investor is classified as short-term investors if its 
past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the top tertile. An institutional investor is classified as long-term 
investors if its past 4-quarter turnover rate ranks in the bottom tertile. MKTCAP is market capitalization. 
Age is firm age measured as number of months since first return appears in the CRSP database. DP is 
dividend yield. DP is winsorized at the 99th percentile. BM is book-to-market ratio. BM is winsorized at the 
1st percentile and 99th percentile. PRC is share price. TURN is the average monthly turnover over the 
previous quarter. VOL is the monthly volatility over the past two years. SP500 is dummy variable for S&P 
500 index membership. RETt-3, t is the lagged three-month return. RETt-12, t-3 is the lagged nine-month return 
preceding the beginning of the quarter. All variables except institutional ownership, S&P 500 index 
membership, and stock returns are expressed in natural logarithms. We estimate cross-sectional regressions 
for each quarter. We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology and report the time-series average 
regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are p-values based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Regression coefficients on institutional ownership and trading that are statistically significant at the 5 
percent levels are in bold. All returns are in percent. 
